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RECENT international economic events and gov-
ernment pronouncements have focused renewed at-
tention on the future of the Bretton Woods inter-
national monetary system. What is the system now?
What would we like it to be in the future? The debate
is not a new one. Economists for years have recog-
nized the system’s actual and potential problems and
have proposed a plethora of solutions to resolve ques-
tions about: (1) the distribution, size, and growth of
international reserves; (2) the difficulty of interna-
tional adjustment in a world of highly mobile capital
when nations are committed to full employment;
(3) the confidence problem, that is, shifts in prefer-
ences among national currencies and other kinds of
reserve assets; and (4) the appropriate role for gold.
Financial ministers and heads of central banks have
also debated, these questions.
Quite often, analyses of current problcsns and future
needs of the international monetary system have arisen
only out of monetary crises, and the adopted at! hoc
solutions have shown no comprehcnsive plan for the
future of the Bretton Woods system. Now, for perhaps
the first time since 1944, there is general agreement
that all aspects of the Bretton Woods system should
be re-evaluated, and that certain characteristics of the
system be altered to meet the requirements of inter-
national trade and exchange in the 1970s.
The critical economic problems which brought ques-
tions about restructuring the Bretton Woods system
to the forefront of economic discussion at the conclu-
sion of the 1960s were short-term capital flows and
the failure of the system to promote international
adjustment. These problesns were natural develop-
ments from gradually changing economic conditions
in the 1950s and 1960s. Lower international trade
barriers, the establishment of general currency con-
vertibility in 1958, improved capital markets, and the
growth of multinational corporations contributed to
increased capital mobility. Lack of harmonization of
stabilization policies among nations, inappropriate
alignment of parity rates, and political constraints on
changing parity rates contributed to problems of in-
ternational adjustment. Recent actions among major
industrial countries have made a start toward restruc-
turing the Bretton Woods system with new parity
rates, widened margins, and the use of SDRs.
The following article summarizes the historical de-
velopment from 1944-70 of the problems that arose
in twenty-five years of operation of the system, and
discusses some of the proposals offered toward the
conclusion of the 1960s to remedy the major short-
comings of the system. The purpose of looking at the
historical development of the problems and the pro-
posed solutions is to provide a backdrop for current
discussions of international monetary arrangements.
While the events of 1971 and 1972 already indicate a
movement toward correcting some of the problems,
they have also revealed new problems, the discussion
of which is beyond the scope of this article.
THE ERETTOIN WOODS SYSTEM
AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUI.TI)
Let us begin by examining the design of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). The Articles of
Agreement state the purposes of the institution as
follows:
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(i) ‘lo promote international monetar coopera-
tion through a persnanent institution which
provides the machinery for consultation and col-
laboration on international monetar prohlems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced
growth of international trade, and to contribute
thereby to the promotion and maintenance of
lsigls levels of employment and real income and
to the development of the productive resources
of all members as primary objectives of eco-
nomic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain
orderly exchange arrangements among mem-
bers, and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation.
iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral
system of payments in respect of current trans-
actions between members and in the elimina-
tion of foreign exchange restrictions which
hamper the growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the
Fund’s resources temporarily’ available to them
under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in
their balance of payments without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international
prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the
duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium
in the intemational balances of payments of
members.!
Parity Values
The mechanism chosen to promote international
cooperation while facilitating high levels of employ-
ment and real income was a regime of defined parity
rates. From time to time, parity rates were to be
redefined whenever necessary to correct fundamental
disequilibria in balances of payments. In order to
maintain consistency in the definition of parity rates,
each nation effectively defined its currency in terms
of gold. Thus, all currencies were tied to gold and
indirectly to each other.
Within a group of nations whose currencies were
fully convertible and in which the currency of onena-
tion served as both domestic and international money,
the number of exchange rates that could be inde-
pendently defined was one less than the total nurn-
her of nations, For example, in a group of three
nations, country A can state the monetary value of
its currency in terms of C’s currency, and country B
can state the monetary value of its currency in terms
~International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement
(\Vashington, D.C.: International Monetary F’und, 1944
and 1969), p. 2.
of C’s currency. By virtue of this action the parity rate
between country A and 13 is defined. If all three
countries attempted to independently define their
parity rates, a conflict would develop if one country
sought to increase a parity that another country was
trying to lower. Thus, at least one country had to
observe a passive policy in defining its parity rate.
l3y’ practice, that country in the I3retton \Voocls system
has been the LTnitecl States ( country C in the above
example).
Once a svstcm of parity rates was defined, countries
had to choose how to meet their exchange rate stabil-
ity obligations. Individual member countries were
originally required to limit exchange rate fluctuation
to one percent on either side of parity. Most countries
chose to limit exchange rate fluctuations by using the
dollar as tile intervention currency for spot trans-
actions in the foreign exchange market.
The United States chose to meet its exchange
stability obligations through purchases and sales of
gold at $35 an ounce. It is important to note that
the price of monetary gold is not a parity rate in the
same sense as an exchange rate of one national cur-
rency for another. However, under the rules of the
IMF, a change in the U.S. price of gold can alter
parity rate relationships just as does a change in a
parity rate, assuming the dollar rate for any currency
is not devalued to the same extent as the dollar.
Liquidity
Gold, convertible currencies, and general balances
at the IMF were the major sources of international
liquidity in the Bretton Woods system. The IMF had
at its disposal two means for assuring international
liquidity. A temporary means of increasing the supply
of liquidity available to an individual nation was a
procedure known as “drawing” on the general account
of the Fund. Individual nations could borrow from
the Fund’s pool of currencies (which had been con-
trihuted on the basis of a pre-arranged quota system)
in order to finance temporary balance-of-payments
deficits. From time to time quotas could be increased
to raise the amount of potential liquidity available
to members.
After 1968, the Fund acquired the ability to con-
sciously supplement the long-run growth of reserve
assets pennanently available to all member nations by
creating Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Participat-
ing countries were free to draw on the special account
of the Fund \vithout consultation or challenge of poli-
cies designed to restore balance-of-payments equilib-
rium (unlike drawing on the general account).
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Countries which used SDRs might incur an obhgation
to “reconstitute” their position with the IMF to some
extent, depending on the amount and duration of
SDR use.
Balance-of-Payments Correction
Because countries were expected to experience
balance-of-payments disequilibria from time to time,
a method had to be devised to eliminate surpluses
and deficits which would involve neither trade or
payments restrictions nor undermine the essence of a
par value system. Provision of ample liquidity (re-
serves) merely provided time for countries to take
corrective balance-of-payments action, but did not in
itself eliminate surpluses and deficits. Furthermore,
it was only persistently large deficits and surpluses
which the Fund viewed as detrimental to interna-
tional monetary order.
Stabilization policies were expected to be the first
line of defense in eliminating reserve gains and losses.
It was presumed that countries would use mnonetary
and fiscal policies to achieve high-employment ob-
jectives, and no country was expected to suffer severe
unemployment to protect its balance-of-payments
position. It was also felt that domestic stabilization
policies could remedy many external payments prob-
lems with little loss of domestic real output.
If stabilization policies were insufficient to restore
a country’s competitive position with its major trading
partners, the member country could propose to the
Fund a change in its parity rate. The Fund was re-
quired to concur with the request when it was satis-
fied that the change was necessary to correct a funda-
mental disequilibrium in the balance of payments.
HIISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE
2W ~IU’ ‘lOOT, M”UT I
.A.ND ITS P.ROBI.WMS:
The Bretton Woods system never worked quite the
way it was intended. As background for understanding
the current problems of the system, let us briefly re-
view the problems that arose in twenty-five years of
operation. Many current problems of international
finance can be traced, directly or indirectly, to three
major changes in economic institutions and practices
since 1944. The first major change was the expanded
use of the dollar as an international currency and a
widely accepted reserve asset; the second was the
great increase in the degree of economic interde-
pendence among nations, especially as reflected in
movements of highly mobile capital; and the third
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was the comparative rigidity of parity rates that de-
veloped in actual practice.
The Dollar as an International Currency
The use of the dollar as an international reserve
currency alleviated one problem of the Bretton Woods
system but created two others. The problem that was
remedied was the failure of gold, a key source of
reserves in the Bretton Woods system, to provide a
steady and sufficient increase in international liquidity
over time. The newly created problems were (1) the
gradual accumulation of dollars by foreigners, which
were at first welcomed but later resented, and (2)
the dilemma faced by a reserve currency center in
seeking either to approximate external payments bal-
ance, or to provide an adequate growth of interna-
tional reserves,
Goid. Reserve Problems
The Bretton Woods system depended importantly
on the efficient use and distribution of international
reserves, especially at the conclusion of World War II
and in the late 1940s. Because the United States held
about 70 percent of the world’s total gold stock and
also had a substantial balance-of-payments surplus in
this period, distribution of gold for use as international
reserves proved difficult. Gold reserves available
from other countries were insufficient to settle or
“finance” their payments deficits with the United
States. Even when gold reserves were supplemented
with meager borrowings from the IMF and unilateral
transfers from the United States, large payments im-
balances would have occurred in the postwar period
if there had not been tight regulation abroad of im-
ports and capital movements.
Another problem related to gold was that the sup-
ply of the existing gold stocks and newly mined gold
was insufficient to satisfy the increase over time of
both monetary and nonmonetary demands at a fixed
and unvarying price. Throughout the 1950s and lOGOs
gold demand for nonmonetary purposes rose as world
income rose, as well as demands fo~other metals
substitutable for gold in some uses (silver, platinum,
and palladium). Gold demand for monetary purposes
also rose along with the expansion of income and
trade. However, because the rate of growth of the
gold supply was both erratic and inadequate to match
the expansion in demand over time, and since the
price of gold was not permitted to rise, monetary
authorities were increasingly hard pressed to obtain
monetary gold for addition to international and do-
mestic reserves.
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.Dobar Re~rrve Proviems’
The gold reserve problems would have been far
more severe if they had not been alleviated by the
expanded use of the U.S. dollar as a reserve asset and
world currency after World War II.
The economic size and dominance of the United
States mnade its currency desirable as an international
reserve currency, both before and after 1939. Much
of tIme worlds trade involved U. S. goods, services, or
financial resources, and in addition, the value of the
Amnerican currency proved far more stable over time
than that of many other national currencies (at least
until the late-1960s). Wider acceptability resulted
from wider use and vice versa.
With the creation of the IMF and the obligation
of countries to maintain exchange rate stability, most
countries chose to keep their exchange rate within
prescribed niargins by buying and selling dollars
against the local currency. By virtue of this arrange-
ment, dollars became an intervention currency, and
countries held additional working balances in dollars
a use for dollars that had not existed before World
War II.
The use of the dollar as an international currency
relieved the shortage of gold reserves and provided
sufficient liquidity to finance payments imbalances at
existing exchange rates. However, the continued ac-
cumulation of dollars by major nations throughout the
l950s and l960s raised questions about how many
dollars foreigners would willingly hold, especially of-
ficial foreigners. The United States was looked upon
to provide long-term financial aid and grants to the
lesser developed countries in the l95Os, and, as an
international financial center, to supply capital re-
sources for the expansion of European business firms
and multinational corporations throughout the l950s
and l960s. When U.S. deficits persisted, problems of
interpretation arose as to whether the dollar outflosv
represented a fundamental weakness in the U.S.
economy and therefore required corrective action, or
whether the rules for international reserve accumula-
tion and depletion that applied to trading nations
were inappropriate for the United States which was
the banker for the world as well.
t..i![~S, BoUTe:.nee-of1Paqrnev.ts Olse:’
Throughout much of the lOGOs many people
pointed out that the reserve currency country faced
a dilemma. It could either seek to approximate ex-
ternal payments balance, or permit its deficits to con-
tinue in order to provide adequate growth of inter-
national reserves. Those who argued that approximate
payments balance was the more appropriate objective
of the two reasoned that a reserve currency country
which ran persistent deficits could continuously finance
its deficit simply by printing bank money which of-
ficial foreigners were obliged to hold, and thereby
avoid adjustment of domestic incomes, costs, prices,
and exchange rates. Consequently, the United States
improved its economic position by acquiring foreign
goods and assets while foreigners were left as unwill-
ing holders of dollar assets. Somne foreigners claimed
that this behavior served only to finance Amncrican
enterprise and military adventures abroad.
Those who argued that provision of ample inter-
national reserves was the more appropriate objective
of the two adnmitted that the preceding argument
was not altogether unfounded, but pointed out that
it was an incomplete description of the position in
which the reserve currency center was placed. Major
determinants of U.S. deficits were not just domestic
economic conditions over which it had some control,
but also exchange rate alignment and inflexibility, the
role of the dollar as an international currency, and
persistent surpluses by major industrial nations in the
late lOGOs, over which it had little direct control. Given
the general shortage of international liquidity and
the failure of the international monetary system to
promote adjustment, continued U.S. deficits were not
altogether undesirable. The only danger lay in the
fact that a crisis might be precipitated if there was
a sudden decline in the desire of foreigners to hold
dollars.
Given this dilemma in the lOGOs, U.S. balance-of-
payments policy had to take account of the
haphazard linkage between the supply of addi-
tional reserves, provided by U.S. payments deficits,
and the demand for them, combined with the great
disruption that would result from applying the IMF
prescription for fundamental disequilibrium to the
United States. In dealing with its payments deficit,
the United States has had to thread its way deli-
cately between a desire to reduce the deficit and
a desire to avoid measures for reducing the deficit
that would he destnmctive of domestic objectives or
international order.2
Many U.S. policy actions were directed toward re-
ducing the deficit in the lOGOs, although the efforts
were not as active nor as effective as some would
have liked.
tmRichard N. Cooper. “The Dollar and the World Economy,”
in Agenda for the Nation, ed. Kermit Gordon (Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 485-6.
Page 27FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
Greater Economic Interdependence
More significant in the long run than the problems
associated with gold, the expanded use of the dollar
as an international currency, or U.S. balance-of-pay-
mnents policies were the problems associated with
greater economic interdependence. Greater economic
interdependence and integration brought increasingly
intense clashes between domestic and international
considerations in framing economic policies.
Evidence of increased economic integration was
seen in the financial and technical innovations of the
payments system. Convertibility of major currencies
into dollars after 1058 and the growth of the multi-
national corporation with its improved methods of
cash management both diminished risks and uncer-
tainties in foreign commerce and increased the flow
and efficient use of real and financial resources. The
rapid growth of the Eurodollar market since the
late lO5Os and the Eurobond market since the mid-
lO6Os meant that investors and borrowers could place
and acquire funds in either national or international
markets depending on relative yields, costs, and risks.
The most obvious, but probably not the most seri-
ous, threat to the success of the Bretton Woods system
in a world of growing capital mobility and economic
interdependence was its susceptibility to destabilizing
speculation and other large-scale flows of short-term
capital. In a mnonetary system of general convertibility
among currencies and integrated money and capital
markets, incorrectly aligned exchange rates became
difficult to mnaintain. Hedgers and arbitragers were
quick to take advantage of interest rate differentials,
and leads and lags of corporate payments and receipts
contributed to large capital flows. In order to try to
preserve parity values, central banks sometimes paid
high prices in the loss of foreign exchange reserves,
and on occasion had to subjugate national priorities to
international concerns. When a government failed to
convince speculators that a parity value could be
maintained, it had to accept the outcome associated
with a change in the parity rate — namely, a change in
a country’s growth of income, output, and prices.
Rigidity of Parity Rates and
International Adjustment
A greater threat to the future of the Bretton Woods
system than increased economic interdependence and
speculation was its failure to initiate and promote
international economic adjustment promptly and to
distribute equitably the costs of adjustment among
trading partners. Excessive reluctance to change par-
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ity values eliminated an effective means of achieving
international adjustment.
As price, output, and growth trends diverged, a
country initially had to accept an increased or de-
creased outflow of foreign currency reserves at a
given parity rate, and ultimately a change in internal
prices, output, and income. Given the desire of most
countries to achieve full employment of domestic re-
sources, however, many were unwilling to permit the
changes in internal economic conditions which the
systeni required to remedy paymnents imbalances if
parity rates remained unchanged. Because of the un-
willingness of countries to alter their parity rates or
permit changes in internal prices, outputs, and in-
comnes, market pressures for adjustment were resisted
and adjustment delayed as countries tried to shift at
least part of the adjustment burden to other nations.
A corollary point was that in a moderately well
integrated set of trading nations, a country which
pursued domestic stabilization policies that resulted
in a price and output performance greatly different
from its trading partners experienced a higher rate
of inflow or outflow of international reserves at a
given parity rate than it did if domestic price and
output performance was similar. The impact on re-
serves varied somewhat depending upon the size and
relative efficiency of the nation. However, like the
situation in the preceding paragraph, countries re-
sisted the required changes in either parity rates or
domestic economic conditions, and the Bretton Woods
system failed to achieve adequate international
adjustment.
Occasionally, stabilization policies were capable of
achieving domestic and balance-of-payments objec-
tives sinmultaneously and thereby permitted interna-
tional adjustment. Nonetheless, in cases where con-
flicts arose in the lOGOs, nations tended to choose to
protect domestic employment and output. Tariffs,
quotas, border taxes, and capital controls were often
used (although at a reduced level from the 1950s) to
insulate national markets from international repercus-
sions. Such practices were disguised means of chang-
ing the parity rate and a second best solution to the
adjustment problem.
The adjustment problem became particularly criti-
cal in the case of the United States. As its competitive
position changed gradually over the years, the United
States found itseff unable to exert independent pres-
sure on the exchange rates of dollars for other national
currencies without disrupting international monetary
arrangements (particularly in the lOGOs). The diffi-
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culty of bringing general policy instruments to bear on
payments and adjustmnent problems was even more
severe than in the case of the European economies
because of the smallness of the U.S. foreign sector
relative to its domestic sector, and because the United
States, like the Europeans, often incurred policy con-
flicts between full employment and balance-of-pay-
mnents objectives.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Numerous solutions were proposed to remedy the
problems of the Bretton Woods system. Let us now
review the major alternative solutions to the liquidity
problem, time adjustment problem, and the U.S. bal-
ance-of-payments problem, principally those that
were suggested in the late lOGOs.
A Solution to the Liquidity Problem
The major solution proposed to resolve the liquidity
problems of the Bretton Woods system was the ration-
alization of reserve creation by relying mainly on
Special Drawing Rights — the supply of which was
subject to conscious international control -‘- rather
than on gold or on U.S. dollars. This proposal was
adopted in 1968 and implemented in l97O.~
Since their creation as an official reserve asset,
SDRs have performed some of the functions of an
international mnoney. They have shared the role of
a store of value with gold, and to a linmited extent
served as a medium of exchange among official in-
stitutions. However, it has been the dollar which
has continued to perform de facto, if not de jure, each
of the three classical functions of money for both
private and official uses. As numeraire (common de-
nominator or standard of value), medium of exchange,
and store of value, the dollar has continued to serve
as the dominant source of international money and
liquidity.
It has been suggested that if all currencies were to
be defined in terms of SDRs rather than gold or the
dollar as at present, and all participating countries
were to actively use SDRs in the~purchaseand sale of
convertible currencies, some pressures on the dollar
might be lessened. SDRs \vould then replace gold and
dollars as the primary form of official reserve asset.
Official reserve creation could be consciously con-
trolled by international decisions, thereby removing
the erratic and insufficient growth over time of official
3For a thorough discussion of the mechanics and operation
of SDRs, see Fritz Machlup, Remaking the International
Monetary System: The Rio Agreement and Beyond
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968).
reserves in the Bretton Woods system. The dollar,
because of its convenience and efficiency of use in
foreign exchange markets, would probably remain the
principal private mnonetary asset,
Alternative Solutions to the
Adjustment Problem
Solutions suggested over the last two decades for
the adjustment problem centered around the choice
of parities and how to change the parities when re-
quired, and how much exchange fluctuation to permit
around parities.
Parity Rate Alignment
It was clear that if the adjustnment process of the
Bretton Woods system was to be improved, a way
had to be found to promote orderly and periodic
realignments of parity rates among major nations.
Only when parity rates accurately reflected funda-
mental competitive positions and could be altered in
the absence of anticipatory capital flows could a
significant improvement in the adjustment process be
expected.
By the late 1960s, no proposed solution had yet
been agreed upon that could effectively deal with the
problem, From the restoration of European converti-
bility in 1058 to the devaluation of the U.K. pound in
late 1067, sluggishness of changing par values per-
sisted and the balance-of-payments adjustment process
proved more uncertain than the founding fathers of
the system had anticipated. The series of shocks
from mid-1967 to 1070 indicated that long-run stability
of par values was being achieved at the expense of
short-run stability in the world financial markets.
Throughout the entire period, the United States as
the key currency center could not effectively change
dollar exchange rates for other currencies without
fear of competitive rate changes or of disrupting
international monetary arrangements. Theoretical sug-
gestions were made in an attempt to define respon-
sibilities of trading partners in initiating changes in
parity rates, and in distributing the adjustment burden
equitably among industrial nations, but none of
the suggestions was practical enough to put into
operation.
While little progress was made on the long-run
adjustment problem, there was substantial sympathy
toward the end of the lOGOs for proposed solutions
to short-run adjustment problems. Two alternatives
were offered to increase the extent and speed of
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international adjustmnent in the Bretton Woods system
once a systemn of “correct” parities had been deter-
mined — (1) a widening in the permissible margin of
fluctuation around stable parities, and (2) frequent,
small, discretionary or automatic changes in stable
parities. Either of these alternatives, it was argued,
would improve the short-run adjustment mechanism
and initiate the balance-of-payments adjustment
process more rapidly than in the past. However, it
was also regarded as probable that neither alternative
would substantially improve even the short-run ad-
justment process in the absence of an appropriately
determined initial set of parity rates.
Stable Parity with •Widened Me.rgilns
There was little doubt that widened margins about
stable parities could increase the speed with which
short-run adjustment was initiated and the extent to
which demands for and supplies of currencies were
either encouraged or discouraged. But there was also
recognition that the expected improvement which
would be promoted depended critically upon what
people at any instant in time expected the future
parity rate to be. If people widely beheved that the
future parity rate would be the same as time present
parity, then wider margins would permit changes in
foreign exchange prices to alter capital and trade flows
to some extent without encouraging the massive one-
sided speculation that sometimes occurred under a
system of very narrow margins. Greater exchange
rate flexibility would thereby partially insulate domes-
tic mnoney markets from international movements of
short-term capital. Widened margins about stable par-
ities might prove particularly desirable for countries
in different cyclical positions. This type of short-
run adjustment was not, however, to be regarded as
a substitute for the long-run adjustment created by
parity changes.
If, in contrast to the preceding example, there was
widespread belief that the future parity rate would
be substantially different from the present parity,
speculative activities associated with the former un-
certainties about parity rate changes would recur. In
this situation there would be little that widened mar-
gins could do to discourage destabilizing and other
large-scale flows of short-term capital.
The nature of these conclusions for an individual
country would be complicated further if all nations
had widened margins around theft parities. Nations
are unlikely to attach equal weight to the various
objectives of economic policies. Some nations pre-
fer to tolerate more unemployment, and others
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more inflation, than their trading partners. In addition,
governments differ in their ability to control domestic
costs and prices. Thus, varying domnestic economic
conditions and policy actions might cause currencies
to nmove to the floor or ceiling of the widened mnargin
and stay there, causing sufficient concern to throw
established parities into question. Even if the internal
cost and price trends of all nations \vere identical,
changes in the composition of internationally traded
goods might necessitate changes in parity values. In
these cases, widened margins might or might not be
beneficial in promoting short-run international adjust-
mnent, depending upon the future exchange-rate ex-
pectations that would be generated.
r icr’ i, ~ui Ur”~ ra
A crawling, or gliding, parity was offered as an
alternative to the stable parity. It was often combined
\vith suggestions for widened margins around parity.
Under this system, the ability of widened margins to
improve adjustment was subject to the same qualifica-
tions as in the preceding paragraphs.
The distinguishing feature about a crawling parity
was that the parity value changed gradually over
time up to an agreed upon nmaximum rate. Hence, in
the short run the parity was essentially stable and
could give a degree of certainty to international trans-
actions, while in the long run the gradual change in
parity could reflect small changes in relative costs
and prices and initiate changes in balance-of-pay-
ments positions before disequilibria became massive.
In a world of interdependent nations, frequent and
small changes in parity values could compensate for
differing effectiveness of internal stabilization policies
and gradually changing international trade patterns.
Automatic vs. discretionary parity changes— The de-
desirability of changing parities frequently and by
smnall amounts (as illustrated by the crawling parity)
depended in the minds of many observers on whether
the small changes were discretionary and made by
national governments, or whether they were auto-
matic and made in the international market place.
If the changes were discretionary, government officials
still had to decide when and by how much to alter
the parity rate, just as under the systemn of stable
parities and very narro\v bands. While frequent and
small changes might reduce disruptive capital flows,
government officials would still be pressured on occa-
sion to make decisions that might have unpopular
domestic economic effects. They would remain free
to avoid international adjustment pressures if they
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were willing and able to sustain a loss or gain of
reserves, and they could still be swayed by domestic
concerns to postpone changing the parity rate until
financial and political pressures made it imperative.
If the parity and the margins about the parity
rate were free to change up to an agreed upon maxi-
mumn rate per year in either direction, the market
place would deternmine fluctuations within the margins
while government officials would limit the range of
parity and exchange rate fluctuation by establishing
the mnargins. While many argued that fully automatic
parity changes within agreed upon limnits would greatly
imnprove the adjustment mechanismn, others contended
that some countries might find the system unaccepta-
ble because countries often regard control over theft
exchange rate as an established prerogative of na-
tional sovereignty. Too much fluctuation in the parity,
even when a “correct” initial parity had been de-
tennined, nmight represent diminished control over
domestic resources.
A suggested compromise (which retained most of
the benefits of a discretionary or automatic crawling
parity with widened exchange rate margins, while
respecting concerns over national sovereignty) was
a set of mutuaily agreed upon rules with some degree
of multilateral surveillance. Such rules would be de-
signed to guide the countries in establishing the
margins and limiting the amount of governmental
intervention (if any) within the widened margins.
Possible restrictions on domestic stabilization deci-
sions — It was generally argued that gliding parities
with widened margins permitted increased freedom
for domestic interest rate policy. Stabilization authori-
ties would have more freedom than with stable parit-
ies and very narrow margins to direct policies at do-
mestic interest rates and economic conditions without
encouraging short-term capital flows. Changes in the
parities would mitigate the incentive for shifting in-
terest-sensitive funds that might accompany shifts in
domestic stabilization policy.
However, under certain conditions, crawling pam-i-
ties might tie domestic stabilization decisions just as
closely to international conditions as throughout the
l96Os. If, for example, a country’s parity was highly
predictable and it was widely believed that it would
move downward at a mnaximum permitted annual rate
of two per cent per annum for an extended period of
time and its spot exchange rate would move down
accordingly, domestic stabilization decisions would
have to subnmit to the conditions of international trade,
and domestic interest rates would have to be two per
cent higher than foreign rates if there was to be no
capital outflow. As long as the direction of future
parity and exchange rate movements was clear, ex-
pectations would give rise to the one-sided speculation
which characterized most parity rate changes of major
nations from 1967-70,
Ultimately, any restraint that might be placed on
domestic economic policy decisions from the crawling
parity had to be compared with the restraint that
occurred when a parity was generally considered out
of line, and when capital flows were consequently
stimnnulated by the expectation of a large discrete
adjustment in parities. Many observers believed at
the end of the l960s that once an appropriately
aligned initial set of parities had been agreed upon,
a system of crawhng parities would help to mnaintain
these relative currency values as international trade
patterns shifted gradually over time, and thereby
avoid substantial balance-of-paymnents disequilibria.
Alternative Solutions to the
U.S. Balance-of-Payments Problem
There were three broad schools of thought on inter-
preting the mneaning of U.S. balance-of-payments
deficits in the late lOGOs.4 The first emphasized the
total supply of dollars available. As long as the supply
at some given price was greater than the private
denmand, dollars would flow abroad through one chan-
nel or another and end up being acquired by foreign
central banks. The only sure way to stop the deficit
was to reduce the total supply of dollars relative to
the demand for them, and the way to do this under
a fixed exchange rate system was to mnaintain tight
money.
The second school of thought insisted that a change
in the price of dollars was required. The numerous
ad hoc and direct measures already taken to cure
surpluses and deficits such as border taxes, tariffs,
and interest equalization taxes were ineffective and
highly discriminatory means of reducing the deficit.
What was needed was to remove these impediments
to free trade and have a depreciation of the dollar rel-
ative to the currencies of the surplus countries.
In between the two extremes were those who said
that the demand management approach was irrelevant
because it failed to take into account the conffict
between balance-of-payments and high-employment
4These positions are outlined in Cooper, “The Dollar and
the World Economy,” pp. 495-7, and Robert A. Mundell,
Monetary Theory: inflation, Interest, and Growth in the
World Economy (Pacific Palisades, Califomia: Goodyear,
1971), pp. 166-9.
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objectives which often characterized the U.S. balance-
of-payments problemn. There were also those who
pointed to the limnited relevance of both the demand
and supply approaches because of the difficulty of
bringing general policy instruments to bear on the
payments problem without damaging the domnestic
economy.
Many, but by no means all, interpreters of U.S.
balance-of-payments performance found somne com-
mon ground for agreement. They argued that piece-
mneal measures which had characterized balance-of-
paymnents pohcies in the past should be abandoned
because they were ineffectiveand discriminatory. They
suggested that a viable alternative to previous bal-
ance-of-payments policies and continuous U.S. deficits
was to set parity rates among industrial nations in such
a way as to substantially reduce, but not eliminate
the U.S. deficit, and to reduce the surpluses of mnany
industrial nations. The realigned parity and exchange
rate structure should assure that U.S. surpluses on
current account were sufficient to nearly offset normal
levels of unrestricted net private and Government
investment abroad.
This position recognized that foreigners should no
longer be forced to be unwilling holders of dollars,
and that it was of critical importance to the Bretton
Woods system to maintain confidence in the key cur-
rency. A means of restoring confidence was to reduce
the deficit by parity rate adjustments. This position
also recognized that there was unlikely to be any
fundamental change in the role of the dollar in private
international transactions in the early 1970s. As deficits
were reduced and adjnstment improved in the Bretton
Woods systemn, confidence in the dollar would be
restored and the dollar would continue to be in wide
demand as an international currency. Finally, sup-
porters of this position recognized that a more flexible
means of realigning parity rates in the future had to
be coupled with other reforms, if there was to be a
permanent and significant improvement in the U.S.
balance-of-payments position and in international
mnonetary arrangements.
EPILOGUE
This statement of the historical evolution of prob-
lems of the Bretton Woods system and some of the
proposals offered for their resolution at the close of
the lOGOs is intended as background material for
understanding negotiations about international mone-
tary arrangements that have occurred in 1971 and
1972. There has already been some movement to
achieve improved adjustment and liquidity perform-
ance of the Bretton Woods system, as is evidenced by
a realignment of parities, a widening of margins
around parities, and adoption and limnited use of SDRs.
The events of 1971 suggest, however, that the im-
provement came at the cost of disrupting inter-
national monetary order. Furthennore, the problem
of the key currency country initiating changes in its
own parity rate is likely to remain a critical one. It
may well be that unless corrective action is taken in
each of the problem areas of the Bretton Woods sys-
tenm, a “solution” to any individual problem may rep-
resent little permanent improvement.
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